Assumptions in Quantum Cryptography

Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure, assumptions are made about the protocol and its devices. If these assumptions are not justified in an implementation then an eavesdropper may break the security of the protocol. Therefore, security is crucially dependent on which assumptions are made and how justified the assumptions are in an implementation of the protocol. This thesis is primarily a review that analyzes and clarifies the connection between the security proofs of quantum-cryptography protocols and their experimental implementations. In particular, we focus on quantum key distribution: the task of distributing a secret random key between two parties. We provide a comprehensive introduction to several concepts: quantum mechanics using the density operator formalism, quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution. We define security for quantum key distribution and outline several mathematical techniques that can either be used to prove security or simplify security proofs. In addition, we analyze the assumptions made in quantum cryptography and how they may or may not be justified in implementations. Along with the review, we propose a framework that decomposes quantum-key-distribution protocols and their assumptions into several classes. Protocol classes can be used to clarify which proof techniques apply to which kinds of protocols. Assumption classes can be used to specify which assumptions are justified in implementations and which could be exploited by an eavesdropper. Two contributions of the author are discussed: the security proofs of two two-way quantum-key-distribution protocols and an intuitive proof of the data-processing inequality.Comment: PhD Thesis, 221 page

Security of two-way quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum channel to distribute a shared secret string to two distant users. However, protocols exploiting a two-way quantum channel have been proposed as an alternative route to the same goal, with the potential advantage of outperforming one-way protocols. Here we provide a strategy to prove security for two-way quantum key distribution protocols against the most general quantum attack possible by an eavesdropper. We utilize an entropic uncertainty relation, and only a few assumptions need to be made about the devices used in the protocol. We also show that a two-way protocol can outperform comparable one-way protocols.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figure

An intuitive proof of the data processing inequality

The data processing inequality (DPI) is a fundamental feature of information theory. Informally it states that you cannot increase the information content of a quantum system by acting on it with a local physical operation. When the smooth min-entropy is used as the relevant information measure, then the DPI follows immediately from the definition of the entropy. The DPI for the von Neumann entropy is then obtained by specializing the DPI for the smooth min-entropy by using the quantum asymptotic equipartition property (QAEP). We provide a new, simplified proof of the QAEP and therefore obtain a self-contained proof of the DPI for the von Neumann entropy.Comment: 10 page

Entanglement verification with realistic measurement devices via squashing operations

Many protocols and experiments in quantum information science are described in terms of simple measurements on qubits. However, in a real implementation, the exact description is more difficult, and more complicated observables are used. The question arises whether a claim of entanglement in the simplified description still holds, if the difference between the realistic and simplified models is taken into account. We show that a positive entanglement statement remains valid if a certain positive linear map connecting the two descriptions--a so-called squashing operation--exists; then lower bounds on the amount of entanglement are also possible. We apply our results to polarization measurements of photons using only threshold detectors, and derive procedures under which multi-photon events can be neglected.Comment: 12 pages, 2 figure

Squashing Models for Optical Measurements in Quantum Communication

Measurements with photodetectors necessarily need to be described in the infinite dimensional Fock space of one or several modes. For some measurements a model has been postulated which describes the full mode measurement as a composition of a mapping (squashing) of the signal into a small dimensional Hilbert space followed by a specified target measurement. We present a formalism to investigate whether a given measurement pair of mode and target measurements can be connected by a squashing model. We show that the measurements used in the BB84 protocol do allow a squashing description, although the six-state protocol does not. As a result, security proofs for the BB84 protocol can be based on the assumption that the eavesdropper forwards at most one photon, while the same does not hold for the six-state protocol.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures. Fixed a typographical error. Replaced the six-state protocol counter-example. Conclusions of the paper are unchange

An intuitive proof of the data processing inequality

The data processing inequality (DPI) is a fundamental feature of information theory. Informally it states that you cannot increase the information content of a quantum system by acting on it with a local physical operation. When the smooth min-entropy is used as the relevant information measure, then the DPI follows immediately from the definition of the entropy. The DPI for the von Neumann entropy is then obtained by specializing the DPI for the smooth min-entropy by using the quantum asymptotic equipartition property (QAEP). We provide a new, simplified proof of the QAEP and therefore obtain a self-contained proof of the DPI for the von Neumann entropy